This paper seeks to examine the usefulness of the dominant theories of International Relations in order to understand and account for the ‘Rise of China’. The paper defines the rise of China as the decade upon decade of sustained economic growth, and rapid accumulation of political, social and technological power. China is broadly seen to be at the vanguard of the redistribution of power in the international system (Dellios, 2005). This has led to increased uncertainty in international leadership with both scholars and practitioners of statecraft posing the question: how will this impact the Liberal rule based order we’re accustomed to? And, as China’s wealth and strategic powers grow, what can we expect?
The method of inquiry is to draw on perspectives of Realism and Liberalism with a view to assessing the benefits of applying dual theories in developing an understanding of China’s rise. Firstly, with the Realist paradigm; introducing its foundational assumptions; followed by a Liberalist theoretical perspective, providing some brief examples of state actions which the perspectives highlight. Finally, concluding with critical analyses of the usefulness of the paradigms for understanding China’s accent.
The Realism theory of International Relations is broad in scope, encompassing contentious points of view throughout development: Classical Realism, Structural Realism (Neo-realism), Defensive Realism, Offensive Realism, Neoclassical Realism and the like (Donne, 2007; Kurki, 2010). This is also true with Liberalisms development. The paper purposefully distances from the theories internal developmental debates and focuses on the consistent progressive argumentative currents from each. Forthwith, the central application pertains to Liberalism and Realism’s common base assumptions, which are summarised as introduced. This restricted approach is proposed to provide a platform for succinct comparative insights to be made. The case of China’s ascent is used in this paper to address the questions: Are the perspectives contrasting or complimentary? Does application of multiple International Relations theories provide more holistic and less biased perspective to understanding China’s behaviour?
Foundational Realism.
Within Realism nation states are the central actors; they are rational; the world is anarchic; states seek survival and the system largely determines the outcome and behaviour of actors (Lebow, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2001; Kurki, 2010). Realist literature embodies a pessimistic world view such as mankind (from the classical realist orientation) and therefore nation states are described as ‘rationally’ self-interested and competitive. This presents ‘a history repeating itself’ scenario, whereby all interpersonal or interstate actions inevitably lead to conflict through defence of one’s existing base power or in pursuit of further gains. The theories primal focus is power – How much do States have? How can they attain more? How do we compare with our peers? Morthangue (1948) explains that all politics is a struggle for power and that this is inseparable from social life itself.
The premise that states are rational actors is also shared with Liberalism, and provides a consistent frame with which to theorise. This foundational ontological assumption provides a powerful argumentative impetus for Realists to justify, explain or predict the course of action which ‘rational’ actors have, should, or will take. Realism’s focus on power is epitomised through the ‘balance of power’ theory. This foundational concept explains that states’ behaviour is driven by the need to find parity or stability between competing forces – typically through military capabilities and formation of alliances (Kurki et al, 2010). This is central to application, as Realists argue that the only path to achieving momentary peace is through maintaining a relative and appropriate balance of power (Kurki et al, 2010).
Within Realism world politics is a ‘zero-sum’ game, and with the complexity of multiple actors, regardless of efforts to balance effectively, conflict was, is, and will never be far away (Kurki, 2010; Mearsheimer, 2010; Morgenthau, 2001). These fundamental arguments from Realism consolidate to form an overwhelmingly cautionary message. Essentially, this emphasises that states must exercise a pragmatic and proactive approach to world politics and security, with a healthy distrust of others intentions and strict adherence to one’s balance of power, to maintain and progress national interests and to maintain relative peace.
It’s no surprise that seminal Realists caution that if China is to maintain its domestic economic growth and international financial strength, the world will undoubtedly confront significant security competition between the United States and China (Walt, 1979). What evidence is there that China is seeking to balance other states, regionally and globally?
Realism and the Rise of China.
International security in Asia is arguably maintained by the US relationships built on hard bilateral security ties and soft multilateral economic relations (Qianqian, 2010). The US-Japan alliance is broadly accepted as the cornerstone of the security order in the region and is further strengthened by pivotal alliances forged with South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Indonesia, India and Vietnam (Ikenberry, 2004). Realists argue that for a stable world system there needs to be a dominant single-nation state. This dominant single-nation state or hegemony can be understood as the State’s ability to independently dominate the rules and arrangements of international political and economic relations (Kurki, 2010).
During the 1990s, the US foreign policy community engaged in lively debate about whether America’s post–cold war hegemony could be sustained over the long haul or was it merely a ‘uni-polar moment’. (Layne, 2008). Realists argue that this ‘uni-polar’ dominance and extended period of relative peace is being increasingly threatened by China’s ascent: A rising China is likely to try to push the US out of Asia, in the same way that the US forced the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere (Mearsheimer 2005).
China’s defence budget has increased dramatically over the past two decades, arguably demonstrating that indeed China is seeking to balance the US presence in East Asia (Krauthammer, 2006). Beijing views American power and the relative position of China as a critical factor in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy (Glaser, 2010). The Chinese have security analysts who systematically analyse the international situation seeking to identify the slightest shifts in the global balance of power. These ‘think tanks’ provide research, analysis and policy advice to the Chinese leadership (Glaser, 2010). These foreign policy experts have methods which benchmark comprehensive national power (CNP); a concept which captures the sum total strengths of a country in economy, military, science and technology, education, resources and soft power (Glaser, 2010). The documented existence of this work, illustrates Beijing’s extreme sensitivity to its relative power position amongst states, and furthermore it highlights an active interest in strengthening this.
Additionally, China’s regard to the South and Yellow seas, limited response and action towards North Korea’s aggression and Taiwan all indicate that they are in effect seeking to assert sovereignty over an increasing sphere of influence (Qianqian, 2010). In efforts to maintain, strengthen and contain China, America has been actively reasserting its regional alliances. In November, 2011, US President Obama announced plans to deploy an additional 2500 marines in Australia (Whitlock, 2012). In March, 2012, further reports substantiated this expansion of Australian and US military ties specifying joint capabilities for Drone flights and increased US access to Australian ports. Analysts/realists claim this is in direct response to a rising China – with growing military strength and more Asian nations seeking support from the US (Whitlock, 2012).
Immediately, these announcements elicited a negative response from Beijing, accusing President Obama of escalating military tensions in the region (Whitlock, 2012). These examples indicate both China’s drive for increased power and influence and concurrently, highlight US efforts to maintain their power, and their regional influence. State actions also demonstrate a shared distrust between the primary and secondary actors, acknowledging the theoretical core underpinnings of the Realism paradigm.
Foundational Liberalism.
Liberalism seeks to address problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in International Relations – Proponents contend that with increased economic interdependence between states, there’s a decrease in the likelihood of conflict (Kurki, 2010; Nye, 1998; Qianqian, 2010). Consistent within Liberalism theorem is an optimistic ‘glass half-full’ view of the world – Humans are capable of enlightened cooperation. In fact cooperation and interdependence of states is central to the liberal perspective. Liberal theorists stand opposed to Realism’s ‘zero-sum’ perspective with firm assertion of a ‘non-zero-sum’ view of world politics and state relations (Kurki, 2010). Liberalism and Realism share the view that the international system of states is anarchic. However, Liberalism theory argues that there is an increasing and growing order, which is directly attributed to the interdependence and formalized interaction, facilitated through various multi-lateral organizations.
These have successfully established operating norms, and uphold a consistent approach to the rule of law amongst participating entities. (Nye, 1998). Although sharing some common ontological grounding with Realism, fundamentally, these perspectives are opposed. Can we observe China adopting liberal principals through increased participation in international forums, both political and economical? In China’s case, what does the Liberalism lens illuminate?
Liberalism and the Rise of China.
The examples of China increasing involvement in regional and international multi-lateral organizations over the past few decades are numerous (Nye, 1998). China’s initial participation was passive, however it’s been observed that this has now shifted to what is described as an active contributor and proactive participant (Qianqian, 2010). This demonstrates an increasingly confident China on the world stage, whilst suggesting that Beijing views such forums as useful mechanisms for moderating and managing relationships spanning economic, security and various other political spheres. Liberalists argue that Beijing’s regional policies demonstrate a view that they see institutions as a more feasible way to manage and protect its economic interests, than a drive for military power. Furthermore, these organisations moderate and restrain China’s foreign policy behaviour, encouraging cooperative actions and reinforcing norms amongst member states. The growing interdependence broadly acknowledges that China’s preference is to resolve disputes through peaceful measures.
Liberalists argue that the closer economic cooperation between China and ASEAN has promoted a more cordial atmosphere and cooperative relations between them in political and security spheres (Nye, 1998; Qianqian 2010; Russet, 2010). Evidence to support this has been through China’s commitment to principles of non-aggression and non-interference, concurrently with a variety of conflict resolution mechanisms (Qianqian, 2010).
These are examples by which the Liberalism frame demonstrates a convincing argument, whereby the complex inter-state relationships and engagement are directly contributing to increased, and sustained peaceful development of the region.
Conclusions.
This paper has demonstrated some insights into the narrative of a rising of China – a vastly complex issue, which would undoubtedly require substantial research recounting key historical events to reach any comprehensive conclusions. However, through limited application of the Realist and Liberalist lens to China, maintaining a curiosity to the relevance and usefulness of the theory, it is has enabled a platform for comparison. Overall, both theories offer valuable insight into China’s rapid ascent. Realism’s perspective upon power, directs immediate attention to fundamental state security issues; providing a useful framework to explain China’s actions, and furthermore the ability for contextual predictive insight. The Liberalism lens sheds light on the motivations and benefits of China’s increased involvement in regional institutions, drawing specific attention to economic development. As with Realism, this paradigm provides a framework for explaining past actions, predicting and guiding future decisions.
Evidently, increased economic interdependence and the rise of international institutionalism is an domain which Realism does not breach. This is one example that exemplifies how these perspectives complement each other. It’s clear through this brief theoretical application that Realism and Liberalism theories are both competitive and complementary. Realism’s foundational link to state behaviour as a reflection of inherent human behaviour can be observed in multiple dimensions of life; be that interpersonal, inter-group, inter-state. The Realist’s have no shortage of examples which perpetually demonstrate cyclical repetition of history, thus reinforcing the paradigms core arguments, such as self serving actors seeking power which inevitably leads to conflict. Liberalism with its dominant focus on collaboration, and implied natural progression towards seeking cooperation to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes can also draw on a multitude of examples in interpersonal, international and state relations to substantiate its perspective.
Evidence suggests that ‘the reality’ exists somewhere between these two polar extremes in International Relations theorem. It therefore would require further examination and application of alternate progressive paradigms to substantiate and test this hypothesis. From this succinct analysis, I conclude that pragmatic states should ‘hope for the best’, act and plan with strategic possibilities for improved and increased cooperation, whilst with the constant notion of conflict in International Relations, plan and prepare for the worst.
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